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Preface 
 
 
 
The Common Market Organisation for fruits and vegetables is currently under review. In 
the fruit and vegetables sector, crops for the processing industry are heavily subsidised. 
This also holds for processing tomatoes for which the subsidies amount to 50% of the pro-
duction value. In the framework of the current evaluation, the European Commission con-
siders reducing and decoupling the subsidies for processing tomatoes. This report may give 
a contribution to the discussion by considering two scenarios for reform: abolishing the 
production subsidy and replacing the subsidy by area payments.  
 The Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Food Quality requested 
LEI to perform the research on which this report is based. This report has been made by 
Frank Bunte and Pim Roza using LEI's simulation model for fruits and vegetables 
HORTUS. The researchers are grateful to Gerrit Meester and Raymond Tans (Ministry of 
Agriculture) for their comments. They are also grateful to professor Gabriele Canali (Uni-
versity of Cremona, Italy) who commented on an earlier version of this report.  
 
 
 
Dr. J.C. Blom 
Director General LEI B.V. 
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Summary 
 
 
 
The Common Market Organisation (CMO) for processed fruit and vegetable products is 
currently evaluated by the European Commission. The evaluation may lead to a reform of 
the CMO. Within the framework of the evaluation and the possible reform by the European 
Union, the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Food Quality called 
upon LEI to evaluate the CMO for processing tomatoes. Currently, the production of proc-
essing tomatoes is subsidised with a 34.50 euro subsidy per tonne. The Ministry of Agri-
culture is interested in the impact the reform of the production subsidy may have on 
production and trade patterns of fresh and processing tomatoes as well as other fruits and 
vegetables. The CMO for processing tomatoes is laid down in EC Regulation nr 2201/96. 
In 2001 the regulation was adapted for the last time.  
 The processing tomato supply chain is a large sector in the Mediterranean countries 
and to a lesser extent in new member economies such as Poland and Hungary. The Euro-
pean tomato processing industry processed more than 11,000,000 tonnes of raw tomatoes 
in 2004. Italy is by far the most important producer of processed tomatoes in Europe with a 
53% share of European production followed by Spain (22%) and Portugal and Greece 
(10% each). The production of processing tomatoes still grows fast, notably in Spain and 
Italy. Processing tomatoes are produced on relatively large farms specialised in extensive 
production of arable crops and vegetables.  
 The CMO for processing tomatoes goes back to 1978 and has been reformed in 2001. 
Under the 1978 regime, growers were subsidised through the processing industry. From 
2001 onwards, growers are subsidised directly. The subsidies involved in the support of the 
processing tomato supply chain are substantial: a budget of 300 million euro amounting to 
50% of producer turnover. Both the 1978 and the 2001 subsidy schemes are associated 
with substantial overproduction. Actual expenses in 2005/06 and 2006/07 (380 and 360 
million euro respectively) exceed the EU budget by far. The 2001 subsidy regime spurred 
concentration at the processing level except for Italy. 
This report analyses two possible reforms of the processing tomato supply chain: (I) 
the abolishment of the production subsidy for processing tomatoes; and (II) the abolish-
ment of the production subsidy plus the introduction of a compensating area payment. The 
area payments are assumed to prescribe the allocation of some land to processing tomatoes 
in order to prevent unfair competition with growers of other vegetables, fruits and arable 
crops. Scenario I comes to the following conclusions:  
- the reduction in the production subsidy is likely to be passed through into higher in-
put prices for tomato processors. Input prices may rise with almost fifty percent. 
Grower prices will decrease to some extent (0-2%); 
- production of European processing tomatoes will fall by 15% in Greece, Portugal and 
Spain and by 36.5% in export-oriented Italy given the price elasticities chosen. The 
fall in production may be compensated by the current growth in the demand for proc-
essing tomatoes; 
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- Mediterranean farmers will switch from processing tomatoes and other extensively 
produced crops towards fruits and fruit vegetables. Note that this result contrasts and 
complements the agronomic perspective posited above; 
- in North-European markets, Mediterranean fruit exporters crowd out domestic pro-
ducers and other exporters. As a result, North European growers switch from fruit to 
vegetables production. This also holds for the Netherlands.  
 
If the abolishment of the production subsidy is compensated by area payments, the 
above results change into the following results:  
- grower prices fall substantially. Area payments create a divergence between land and 
output developments in the Mediterranean. Demand for and - as a result - supply of 
processing tomatoes fall more sharply than land allocated to processing tomatoes. 
The area allocated to processing tomatoes decreases by 10-15%; production of proc-
essing tomatoes diminishes by 12-20%. Growers of processing tomatoes produce 
more extensively and thereby reduce capital and labour input. Grower prices fall with 
production costs due to sharp price competition; 
- mediterranean growers switch to vegetables in the open (and probably also to arable 
crops). They also switch to some extent to fruits and fruit vegetables. North European 
production is hardly influenced.  
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1. Introduction  
 
 
 
The Common Market Organisation (CMO) for fruit and vegetable products is currently 
evaluated by the European Commission. The evaluation may lead to a reform of the CMO, 
among other things in order to meet (future) WTO1 requirements. The CMO for fruits and 
vegetables makes a distinction between fresh and processed fruits and vegetables. For fresh 
fruits and vegetables, the European Union actively reduces its role with respect to market 
withdrawals of temporary oversupply and actively supports producer organisations to set 
up market driven and environmentally friendly supply chains. For processed fruits and 
vegetables, the European Union actively supports European production through production 
subsidies for tomatoes, peaches, pears and citrus. There is also an active support 
programme for fresh bananas and citrus.  
Within the framework of the evaluation and the possible reform by the European 
Union, the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Food Quality called 
upon LEI to evaluate the CMO for processing tomatoes. More in particular, the Ministry of 
Agriculture is interested in the impact the reform of the production subsidy for processing 
tomatoes may have on production and trade patterns of fruits and vegetables in Europe. For 
the Netherlands, this interest refers primarily to the impact on fresh tomatoes. The CMO 
for processing tomatoes is laid down in EC Regulation nr 2201/96. In 2001 the regulation 
was adapted for the last time. In December 2006, the European Commission is expected to 
lay down the evaluation of current policy for the processing tomato supply chain and the 
possible reform of this policy.  
 This report evaluates the current CMO for processing tomatoes as well as the effects 
of the following changes in the CMO: the abolishment of the production subsidy and the 
introduction of area payments (decoupling). The analysis of the effects of changes in the 
subsidy scheme focuses on the impact the reform may have on the production and trade 
pattern of fruits and vegetables in Europe. The effects are analysed using HORTUS: LEI's 
partial equilibrium model for the European fruits and vegetables sector. In the simulations 
carried out, HORTUS analyses whether Mediterranean growers switch from processing 
tomatoes to other crops and what effect the increase in Mediterranean production of these 
other crops may have on North European production of fruits and vegetables.  
 This report is constructed as follows. Chapter 2 describes the tomato processing 
supply chain and evaluates the current CMO for processing tomatoes. Chapter 3 estimates 
the substitution elasticities employed in the simulation analysis. Chapter 4 presents the 
results of the simulation analysis. Chapter 5 concludes.  
                                                 
1 World Trade Organisation. 
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2. The European processing tomato sector 
 
 
 
The European Union pursues an active policy for the processing tomato supply chain since 
1978. From 1978 to 2000, the EU subsidised the tomato processing industry through a 
quota system provided the industry paid minimum prices to growers. Since 2000, the EU 
pays production subsidies directly to producer organisations of processing tomatoes. This 
Chapter describes and evaluates the European processing tomato sector (section 2.1); and 
the past and current CMO for processing tomatoes (section 2.2).  
 
 
2.1 The European supply chain  
 
The European tomato processing industry processed 11,380,100 tonnes of raw tomatoes in 
2004. Italy is by far the most important producer of processed tomatoes in Europe with a 
53% share of European production followed by Spain (22%) and Portugal and Greece 
(10% each). Other minor producers include France and some of the new member countries, 
in particular Hungary and Poland. The main products of the tomato processing industry are 
tomato paste (65%) and canned whole peeled tomatoes (27%). Canned tomatoes are almost 
exclusively produced in South Italy.  
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Figure 2.1 European processing tomato output by product and country (1995-2004, 1,000 tonnes, raw 
product equivalent, 3 year average)  
Source: Amitom. 
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European production has grown over the 1995-2004 period (average annual growth 
of 2.3%), in particular in Spain (5.1% growth). Tomato production also increased in 
Portugal and Italy (1.1 and 2.7% growth, respectively), but decreased in Greece and France 
(-1.2 and -2.2% growth, respectively).  
Production and processing is concentrated in a limited number of regions. Due to 
transport costs, production and processing can be found in the same or at least 
neighbouring regions. Figure 2.2 shows the areas in South Europe where tomatoes for 
processing are grown.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Tomato processing areas in South Europe  
 
 
Italy 
Italy has two main producing regions. The tomato paste production is concentrated in 
Emilia-Romagna, more in particular in the area around Parma and Piacenza. Emilia-
Romagna accounts for 32% of Italian production of processing tomatoes and for 35% of 
processing activities. Tomatoes for the canning industry are primarily produced in Puglia 
and Campania. Puglia accounts for 37% of Italian production of processing tomatoes and 
Campania for 5-6%. Processing takes place in Campania (Naples and Salerno). Recent 
production growth took place in North rather than South Italy, among other things because 
the northern supply chain is characterised by economies of scale while the southern supply 
chain specialises in niche markets. The average size of the tomato farming area in the 
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North is larger (16-20 ha) than in the South (less than 8 ha). In the North, mechanisation is 
more widespread and producer organisations are more effective. This gives the North a 
comparative advantage over the South. Moreover, while in the North there are only about 
twenty processing factories, in the South there are more than 120 factories which, of 
course, are smaller.  
Table 2.1 EU quota/threshold (from 2001 onwards) and production (1,000 tonnes)  
 Quota/threshold Production 
1995 6,561 6,691 
1996 6,561 7,868 
1997 6,836 6,896 
1998 6,836 8,068 
1999 6,837 9,123 
2000 6,866 8,410 
2001 8,251 8,449 
2002 8,251 7,817 
2003 8,251 9,153 
2004 8,251 11,380 
2005 8,653 n.a. 
n.a. = not available.  
Source: Amitom.  
 
 
Spain 
Spanish production of tomato paste is concentrated in Extremadura. About 75% of Spanish 
processing tomato production takes place in Extremadura. Other important production 
areas are Andalusia (around Sevilla; 10% and rapidly growing) and the Ebro Valley (12%). 
Harvesting takes place from mid July till end October, the longest harvesting season in 
Europe. The production of tomato paste is concentrated in 15 large enterprises in 
Extremadura. They supply 95% of Spanish tomato paste.  
 
Greece 
Greek production is geographically more dispersed. Production takes place in Macedonia-
Thracia (25%), in Thessalia-Boetia (60%) and on the Peleponnesos (15%). There are 
twenty processors in Greece, four of which supply 60% of Greek production.  
 
Portugal   
Portuguese production of tomato paste is concentrated in the Tajo valley in the Ribatejo 
region (80% of Portuguese production) and in the Alentejo region (10%). About 10% of 
Portuguese production is shipped to Spain for processing. Portugal has about ten tomato 
processors with an average production scale which exceeds production scale in other 
European countries. 
 
France 
French production is concentrated in the southern part of the Rhone Valley (Provence-
Languedoc-Rousillon) and around the Lot and Garonne rivers (Aquitaine-Midi Pyrennées). 
In the Lot-Garonne region, processing tomato production competes with cereal production.  
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New Member States 
In the new member countries, Hungary and Poland process a limited amount of tomatoes. 
Hungary processes 180,000 tonnes - which is comparable to the production in France - and 
Poland 115,000 tonnes.  
Processing tomatoes are grown on large, specialised, mechanised arable farms. 
Typically, producers of processing tomatoes produce tomatoes alongside arable crops such 
as cereals, oil seeds, sugar beets, olives, grapes and vegetables in the open. This is 
illustrated by Table 2.2 which is based on a FADN sample. The table shows that growers 
of processing tomato tend to be large and have arable crops as substitutes in supply. The 
average size of the farms is relatively large compared to the average size of typical 
horticultural enterprises in the Netherlands and the Mediterranean. Average size ranges 
from 20 ha (Puglia) to 185 ha (Emilia-Romagna). Average size allocated to processing 
tomatoes ranges from 4.4 hectares in Puglia to 12.9 hectares in Emilia. Note that the 
numbers are based on the FADN sample and that actual numbers may differ a little.1 
Growers of processing tomatoes grow a range of products most of which are arable crops 
including extensive vegetables. Cereals are the most important crop processing tomato 
growers produce. 'Protected vegetables' are typically not produced by producers of 
processing tomatoes.  
A possible reduction in the subsidy of processing tomatoes is likely to lead to a shift 
to substitute products. From an agronomic perspective, current substitutes in production 
are the most likely candidates. This implies that current growers of processing tomatoes are 
likely to switch to arable crops and extensive vegetables production. In current cropping 
plans, 'protected vegetables' such as fresh tomatoes, cucumbers and sweet peppers are no 
substitutes in supply for processing tomatoes. From an agronomic perspective, there is no 
immediate threat for the Dutch greenhouse vegetable sector as a result of the upcoming 
reform. Vegetables in the open, however, are part of current cropping plans of processing 
tomato growers, especially in Puglia and Ribatejo e Oeste. Since the major part of current 
cropping plans refers to arable crops, one may expect supply substitution between 
processing tomatoes and arable crops as a result of which the total area devoted to fruits 
and vegetables production may fall after the reform of the CMO.  
                                                 
1 According to our Italian consultant, land allocated to processing tomatoes is actually higher in Emilia: 16-
20 ha. 
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Table 2.2 Cropping plans of processed tomato growers (%) 
  Samp
le 
Total 
hectares 
Tomatoes 
for 
processing 
Vegetables 
in the open 
Protected 
vegetables 
Cereals Sugar beets 
and oil seeds 
Olives and 
wineyards 
Other  crops 
Italy Emilia-
Romagna 
60 186.43 6.9 2.2 0.0 46.8 15.8 0.5 27.8 
Italy Puglia 51 19.38 22.7 14.9 0.2 32.6 0.6 22.3 6.7 
Spain Extremad
ura 
11 47.66 14.5 0.0 0.0 41.0 0.3 2.0 42.1 
Portugal Ribatejo e 
Oeste 
56 25.85 45.6 7.6 0.1 23.2 5.3 4.9 13.3 
Portugal Alentejo e 
do 
Algarve 
7 93.07 7.2 1.4 0.1 54.8 10.6 5.3 20.6 
Source: FADN.  
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2.2 The Common Market Organisation for processing tomatoes 
The European CMO for processed fruit and vegetable products has five aims: 
1. maintain 'specialised' productions (actually traditional); 
2. maintain the level of producers' income; 
3. maintain regular supplies to the processing industry; 
4. strengthen the role of producer organisations (POs); 
5. market oriented relations between POs and processors. 
 
As part of the CMO for processed fruit and vegetable products, the CMO for 
processing tomatoes was established in 1978 in order to protect European producers from 
world market competition, in particular Californian competition. World market prices were 
considered too low to allow a reasonable standard of living to European producers 
(Pritchard and Burch, 2003). However, the proposed CMO was initially contested by North 
European nations (mainly importers of processed tomato products), which feared that the 
CMO would have a price-increasing effect. This fear was recognised and the CMO was 
built around domestic support payments, which would have a price-depressing effect.  
 In 1996 the European Union came up with a new CMO for processed fruit and 
vegetable products, but it took until 2001 when the CMO for processed tomatoes was 
amended in order to meet WTO requirements, to curtail expenses on the tomato processing 
supply chain and to address some anomalies in the old regulation. In this section, we 
briefly, address the 1978 regulation before describing the 2001 regulation.  
The CMO for processing tomatoes is made up of three elements:  
- import tariffs on imported processing tomato products. The European tomato 
processing industry is protected from imports from outside the European Union by 
import tariffs on processed tomato products. The ad valorem import tariff has been 
gradually reduced from 18 per cent in 1995 to 11 per cent in 2004. Details may be 
found in Box 2.1; 
- export restitutions for exported processing tomato products. Export subsidies make 
up the difference between European and world market prices in order to foster 
European exports. Details may be found in Box 2.1;  
- support for domestic (European) production. This is by far the most important 
element of the CMO. This part involves 300 million euro (2000) and will be 
elaborated below.  
 
 
Import tariffs and export refunds 
 
Import tariffs 
Imports of processed tomato products into the EU may be subject to presentation of an import license 
(Article 11 (1) of Regulation 2201/1996). Furthermore an import tariff is applied to processes tomato 
imports, according to the Common Customs Tariff, whereby the applied tariff is equal to the bound tariff (see 
table 2.3). Before 2001 a minimum import price had to be fixed, but along with the amendments in 2001 the 
minimum import price for processed tomato products was withdrawn. 
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 Import tariffs for processed tomato products  
  Product  
  
bound 
tariff 
applied 
tariff 
applied 
tariff 
    % MFN % GSP % 
200210 Peeled tomatoes, prepared/preserved 14.4 14.4 0 
200290 Unpeeled tomatoes, prepared/preserved 14.4 14.4 0 
200950 Tomato juice not fermented or spirited 16.4 16.0 0 
210320 Tomato sauces with a basis of tomato puree 10.2 10.2 7.1/0 
Source: WTO, UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS). 
 
 
Export refunds 
Export refunds may be paid on the basis of the difference between European Union and third country prices, 
to enable processed tomato products to be exported competitively to third countries. However, there is no 
European reference price for processed tomato products, like for sugar. Therefore the fixation of the export 
refunds is based on several criteria (see Article 178 of Regulation 2201/1996). The refunds shall be granted 
only on application and on presentation of an export license, and are also applicable to re-exports. In 2000, 
export refunds were € 45-50 per tonne or 8.5% of the free-on-board price for a maximum of 135,000 tonnes, 
and therewith the sum of export refunds for processed tomato products amounted € 6.3 million (Pritchard and 
Burch, 2003). In 2006 the export refund for peeled tomatoes amounted € 45 per tonne. According the annual 
commitments of the European Union with regard to the Uruguay Round Agreement, the volume of 
subsidised exports of processed fruit and vegetables should not be higher than 143,000 tonnes, while the 
maximal budget is € 8.3 million. These figures show that processed tomato products are responsible for most 
export refunds in the processed fruit and vegetables sector. Nevertheless, export refunds have only a 
relatively small impact on the European processed tomato industry. The above mentioned 135,000 tonnes of 
exported products constituted only 1.6% of total processed tomato production. 
Box 2.1 Import tariffs and export refunds 
2.2.1 The 1978 Regulation 
 
From 1978 onwards, the European Community (EC) supported tomato growers by 
establishing minimum prices for tomato growers. Minimum prices were to be paid to the 
growers by tomato processors who received financial aid by the EC in return. Processor aid 
and grower minimum prices were confined to quotas. In brief, the 1978 regulation was 
based on three elements which were amenable by the EC: 
- commodity, national and factory based quota. Financial aid to the processing tomato 
supply chain was attended with a quota system which was supposed to control 
European production and the EC's financial obligations. Factories received aid based 
on their quotas. If a factory had a quota for 20,000 tonnes of raw tomatoes to be used 
in canning, it received quota payments for this amount. Quotas were not transferable, 
but confined to a particular processor. However, quotas were adjustable. If the 
factory would process above-quota tonnage and purchase the additional tonnage from 
growers at minimum prices, its quota might be increased in future years. Production 
exceeded national quota systematically. National quotas were adapted in 1984, 1990 
and 1992. For 1999-2000, quotas were based on average production quantities in the 
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two previous years. In that year, production would exceed quota levels by 33 per 
cent;  
- processor aid per tonne of quota. The EC could influence its expenses and the supply 
chains' incentive to produce through the processor aid per tonne. Processor aid per 
tonne fell steadily from 1978 onwards. However, in percentage of output prices, aid 
remained constant till 1997 (Pritchard and Burch, 2003). Since 1997, processor aid 
has been reduced substantially, both in euro and in percentage of output prices; 
- minimum prices for growers for in-quota tomatoes. Tomato processors paid 
minimum prices to tomato growers for in-quota tomatoes. Out-of-quota prices were 
the outcome of market forces. Growers received a weighted average of in-quota 
minimum prices and out-of-quota market prices. Minimum prices were reduced 
throughout the 1978-2000 period and finally abolished in 2001. 
 
The 1978 support regime was attended with the following anomalies: 
- processors had an incentive to process above-quota supplies and even to buy them at 
minimum prices in order to protect their future quota. The tendency to overproduce 
led to adjustments of the national quota in several years (see above); 
- because quotas were not transferable, (small) inefficient processors were protected 
from competition by (large) efficient processors. There has been little economic 
restructuring in the European tomato processing industry in the 1990s (Pritchard and 
Burch, 2003). The number of processors hardly fell and the production scale remains 
low. In 2000, sixty per cent of all tomato factories have quota of less than 10,000 
tonnes and twenty per cent quota less than 1,000 tonnes. In California, plants with a 
capacity of over 1,000,000 tonnes exist; 
- the 1978 arrangements were associated with problems of transparency and 
accountability, especially in South Italy (Pritchard and Burch, 2003). The existence 
of ghost stocks was common knowledge. However, the amount of fraud remained 
unclear. Fraud was also encouraged by the need to protect future quota.  
2.2.2 The 2001 Regulation  
In 2001, the 1978 arrangement was amended by a new arrangement. In 1996 the common 
market organisation of processed fruit and vegetables was already reformed through 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/96, when a new regulation on processed tomatoes 
(2699/2000) was adopted in December 2000. The main change was the replacement of the 
quota and the minimum price arrangements by a production threshold regime. Furthermore 
the subsidies are now paid to tomato growers (via producer organisations) instead of 
tomato processors and minimum prices do no longer apply. The new arrangement depends 
on two elements.  
- grower subsidies (aid for processing). Growers receive a subsidy per tonne of tomato 
produced. Subsidies do no longer depend on the products made out of raw tomatoes 
(box 2.2). The subsidy equals € 34.50 per tonne and is fixed in perpetuity at this rate. 
Subsidies are granted to producer organisations. These producer organisations also 
negotiate grower prices (of raw tomatoes for processing) with the tomato processing 
industry, which in principle reflect market prices. These prices as well as the 
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negotiated quantities are laid down in contracts between producer organisations and 
processors; 
- European and national thresholds. The processing aids are confined to tomatoes 
produced under the national thresholds. The national thresholds are not converted 
into individual thresholds for producer organisations. Instead, the producer 
organisations have to submit applications for processing aid to the responsible 
national authorities. When the application is approved, the quantity applied for shall 
count against the Member State's threshold. Therefore it goes: 'First come, first 
served'. The producer organisations are therefore compelled to submit their 
applications as soon as possible. Possibly, growers and grower associations face a 
Prisonner's Dilemma with regard to their production decisions. Their individual 
production decisions do not influence market prices, but their collective decisions do.  
If a country exceeds its threshold, the payments per tonne are reduced 
proportionately in the following years. Therefore any financial gains to growers in 
one year from increased production are offset by reduced payments in the following 
year. As stated in Article 5(2) of the CMO:  
 
'Whenever a Community processing threshold is overrun, the aid fixed for the 
product in question in accordance with Article 4(2) shall be reduced in all the 
Member States in which the corresponding threshold has been overrun. For the 
purposes of applying the first subparagraph, threshold overruns shall be 
calculated by comparing the threshold with the average quantity processed with 
aid under this Regulation over the three marketing years preceding that for 
which aid must be set. However, to calculate the overrun of the thresholds fixed 
for each Member State, any quantities still available below the threshold of a 
Member State but not processed shall be allocated to the other Member States, 
in proportion to their respective thresholds. The reduction in aid shall be 
proportional to the volume of overrun relative to the relevant threshold.' 
 
The new system will probably be more costly, since the number of tonnes 
eligible for subsidies increased significantly together with the reform: the EU 
threshold in 2001 for processing subsidies amounted 8.251 million tonnes, i.e. 20.7% 
more than the quota of 6.685 million tonnes in 2000. In marketing year 2005/06 the 
threshold was raised to 8.653 million tonnes, as a result of the accession of ten new 
Member States in May 2004. Table 2.4 shows the present national thresholds. As 
from marketing year 2003/04, Spain has sub-divided its national thresholds into two 
separate thresholds. According Article 5(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 
Member States can divide their national thresholds into two sub-thresholds, one for 
whole peeled tomatoes, and one for other tomato products.  
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Table 2.4 EU and national thresholds 
Member State Threshold National share in EU-threshold 
Italy 4,350,000 50.3% 
Spain 1,238,606 14.3% 
 canned whole peeled tomatoes   116,612   
 other tomato products 1,126,994  
Greece 1,211,241 14.0% 
Portugal 1,050,000 12.1% 
France 401,608 4.6% 
Poland 194,639 2.2% 
Hungary 130,790 1.5% 
Slovak Republic 29,500 0.3% 
Malta 27,000 0.3% 
Czech Republic 12,000 0.1% 
Cyprus 7,944 0.1% 
Total EU threshold 8,653,328 100% 
Source: EU Regulation 2201/1996. 
 
The new arrangement is expected to have the following advantages over the 1978 
arrangement:  
- Inefficient processors are no longer protected. Subsidies and quota are granted to 
growers rather than processors. Because growers may switch processors, a dramatic 
reorganisation of the tomato processing industry may be expected. Growers will 
contract efficient processors because they are able to pay higher prices to the 
producers than their inefficient counterparts. Inefficient processors may therefore be 
expected to exit the industry. The exit of these high-cost processors benefits both 
consumers and growers because processor gross margins will fall.  
- Prices may be expected to decrease. Producer aid is no longer attended with 
minimum prices. Prices at all levels in the supply chain may be expected to fall, 
because price formation is free. There is no longer a floor in the supply chain's price.  
- There is more transparency and less fraud. Subsidies are given directly to producers. 
This reduces the risk that processors appropriate part of the subsidies, let alone the 
risks associated with fraud (paper tomatoes). 
- European overproduction will fall. According to Pritchard and Burch (2003) the new 
arrangement limits the incentives to overproduce. Under the previous arrangement, 
production exceeded national quota by far.  
- Rent seeking behaviour. Under the previous system the processors showed rent 
seeking behaviour, by focusing on protecting or increasing their quotas, instead of 
increasing the efficiency of their production. The abolition of individual quotas for 
processors should avoid this. 
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The CMO for processed tomatoes is applied to a range of processed tomato products: 
- peeled tomatoes, whole or in pieces, frozen (CN 0710 80 70) 
- tomato flakes (CN 0712 90 30) 
- peeled tomatoes, whole or in pieces (CN 2002 10 10) 
- unpeeled tomatoes, whole or in pieces (CN 2002 10 90) 
- tomato juice (including passata) (CN 2002 90 11 and 19) 
- tomato concentrate (CN 2002 90 31, 39, 91 and 99) 
- tomato juice (CN 2009 50) 
Box 2.2 Products from the tomato processing industry 
 
2.2.3 The domestic support regime at work 
In this subsection, we describe the performance of the threshold mechanism over the 2002-
2006 period and the implications for EU expenditures.  
As indicated above, production aid equals € 34.50 per tonne of raw tomatoes, 
irrespective of the finished product. In principle the aid is eligible for the total production 
of a Member State, but in case the Community threshold is overrun, the aid for the 
following marketing year is reduced in the Member States that overran their national 
threshold in proportion to the overrun. Table 2.5 shows that Italy, but especially Spain has 
overrun its threshold in 2005/06, which has lead to a 12% reduction in aid for Italy and 
even a 32% reduction for Spain (other tomato products) in 2006/07.  
Table 2.5 Aid for processing tomatoes 
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
Italy  € 34.50  € 34.50  € 34.50   € 30.43  
whole canned tomatoes € 34.50  € 34.50  € 34.50  € 34.50  Spain 
  other tomato products € 34.50   € 29.36   € 31.29   € 23.35  
Greece, Portugal, France € 34.50  € 34.50  € 34.50  € 34.50  
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia,  
Czech Republic, Malta n.a.  € 25.88 a) 
 
€ 34.50  
 
€ 34.50  
a) 75% of € 34.50 in first year after accession; n.a. = not available.  
Source: European Commission. 
 
 
As regard the total amount of aid for processing, the European Commission has set a 
theoretical budget of € 300 million, based on the new threshold (see table 2.4) and the aid 
per tonne (= € 298.5 million). However, the overrun in 2003/04 and 2004/05 (by Spain) 
and in 2005/06 (by Spain and Italy) has led to an enormous increase of expenditure, with 
total spending rising to € 380 million in 2005 (see figure 2.3). Total expenditure is 
expected to decline with the expected decline in Spanish and Italian production. Total 
expenditure in the year 2006/07 has decreased to 362.2 million euro due to the decrease of 
the aid per tonne shown in table 2.5.  
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Figure 2.3 Aid for processing tomatoes, 1999-2005 (million euros) 
Source: European Commission. 
 
 
At the end of section 2.2 some hypotheses with respect to the impact of the new 
domestic support arrangement were laid down. The validity of these hypotheses is 
discussed below. 
 
The number of tomato processors may be expected to fall 
The number of tomato processors has fallen sharply since 2000, as shown by Table 2.6. 
Hereby the fall in the number of processors between 2000 and 2004 is more pronounced 
than the fall between 1994 and 2000 (with the exception of France). Note that the number 
of tomato processors remains large and falls relatively slowly in Italy, where the number of 
factories is still large. The figures seem to support the notion that the number of processors 
will decrease as a result of the domestic support regime introduced in 2001 and that the 
most efficient processors will be left over. The reduction of the number of processors over 
the four year period 2000-2004 (101) exceeds the reduction over the six year period 1994-
2000 (34) by far. The producer organisations will look for the processor with the best offer. 
 
Prices at all levels of the supply chain may be expected to decrease.  
Figure 2.4 shows the development of the producer prices of tomatoes for processing in four 
countries in the last decade. Until the amendments of 2001 a minimum price was kept, 
which explains the lack of variance in prices between the countries. However, with the 
start of the 2001/02 season the prices in the four countries start to diverge. Prices in Italy 
and Portugal behave according to the hypothesis: they decrease in the 2002/03 and 
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2003/04. In the last two seasons the prices show some signs of recovery. Contrary to Italy 
and Portugal the producer prices in Spain and France show an upward trend. With the 
exception of 2001/02 (Spain) and 2002/03 (France), prices have been rising since the 
reform. This has lead to a gap between Italy and Portugal on the one hand and Spain and 
France on the other hand; prices in the last two countries are two times higher. 
Table 2.6 Number of tomato processing factories and number of producer organisations  
 Number of 
factories 
  Producer 
Organisations 
 1994 2000 2004 2004 
France 28 13 9 7 
Greece 42 36 20 ? 
Italy 231 232 200 69 
Portugal 18 16 11 35 
Spain 135 123 79 70 
Total 454 420 319 181 
Source: Pritchard and Burch (2003); EU-MED AgPol (Deliverable D11). 
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Figure 2.4 Producer prices in France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, 1996/1997-2005/06 (US$/100 kg) 
Source: Amitom.  
 
 
There is more transparency and less fraud 
The current system is simpler than the system before 2001. There are two types of 
thresholds, at EU and at national level. No individual quota or thresholds do exist anymore. 
Furthermore, processors cannot receive aid for so-called 'paper tomatoes', since the aids are 
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paid to the growers. Furthermore the producer organisations and processors have to prove 
the fulfilment of the contracts to the competent national authorities. All together the 2001 
reform has created more transparency and reduced the chances of fraud.  
 
European overproduction will fall 
In a certain sense, European producers still overproduce. European production exceeds the 
quotas by far (Pritchard and Burch, 2003). In this respect, the new support arrangement is 
not more successful than the 1978 support mechanism. Production and processing have 
grown substantially in Italy and Spain. This issue is discussed in the Management 
Committee of 14 March 2006. Italy and Spain raised ongoing problems they were facing in 
the tomato sector and they pushed the Commission for action. The Commission said it was 
aware of the problems, but would not be altering the arrangements ahead of reform of the 
regime. Basically, overproduction is only 'punished' by a lower level of processing aid in 
the next year. But growers and producer organisations may be looking at the marginal cost 
of producing additional amounts of tomatoes against somewhat lower processing aids. 
 Rickard (2003) argues that the regime change in 2001 may be expected to lead to 
production growth. Rickard distinguishes inefficient from efficient farms. Before 2001, the 
inefficient farms produced at high costs below the (implicit) quota allocated to them. The 
efficient farms produced at low costs at or above the (implicit) quota allocated to them. 
With the abandonment of the individualised quota regime, the inefficient farms may be 
expected to decline is size and to exit and the efficient farms may be expected to grow. 
With the quota regime and the associated rents vanishing, effective grower prices may be 
expected to rise, effective processor input prices may be expected to fall and as a result 
production may rise.  
 
Rent seeking behaviour 
There are clear signs that rent seeking activity played an important role in the functioning 
of the 1978 domestic support mechanism. Tomato processors processed above-quota 
quantities in order to increase their quota (and to protect their current quota). Outright 
fraud was also used to protect and increase quota allotments (Pritchard and Burch, 2003). 
The domestic support mechanism introduced in 2001 no longer applies to processors. 
Processors probably have lost an instrument to engage in rent seeking. Tomato producers 
may now engage in rent seeking, but they do not have individual quotas, so they are 
dependent on their producer organisation, which competes with other producer 
organisations for a share in the national threshold. On the other hand, producer 
organisations may now engage, to some extent, in rent seeking activities; the more supply 
they control, the more aid they get (and pay to growers).  
2.3 World context 
The EU accounts for one third of world output of processing tomatoes. Major production 
regions outside Europe include: California (US), Turkey, China and Thailand (Pritchard 
and Burch, 2003). California is historically the most important competitive threat for the 
European supply chain. However, this threat may be less important than supposed due to 
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differences in product differentiation: (1) there is a difference between the brixes 
(varieties) supplied in California and demanded in Europe; and (2) the European GMO-
policy protects European production. Heinz e.g. prefers European production over 
American exports. The most imminent threat for European production probably is Turkish 
production. Turkey has a vast production potential and faces low transport costs. China's 
production of processing tomatoes is likely to rise. This may give a spur to Chinese 
exports, but also to Chinese consumption.  
 
 
2.4 Reform of the CMO for processed fruit and vegetable products 
 
Currently the European Commission is preparing to reform the CMO for fresh and 
processed fruit and vegetable products. In a consultation document published in May 2006 
the Commission has presented several arguments for this reform (European Commission, 
2006). In the case of processed tomatoes the most important argument relates to the WTO 
reduction commitments for domestic aid. It is to be expected that the current processing aid 
of € 34.50 will have to be reduced as a result of the WTO commitments. Furthermore, the 
Commission intends to extend the decoupling of support to the fruit and vegetable sector. 
A last argument relates to the market conformity of policy in the fruit and vegetable sector: 
the CMO should better anticipate to changing market conditions. 
A proposal for a reform of both the fresh and processed fruit and vegetable sectors 
will be submitted at the end of 2006. This reform will have serious consequences for the 
processed tomato sector in the EU, as the (growers') aid for processing tomatoes will 
probably be radically altered. The key reform options are: (1) to maintain the status quo; 
(2) to introduce full or partial decoupling; (3) to convert the current (production based) 
subsidy regime into an area-related subsidy. The second option of (partial) subsidy 
decoupling is most popular with the tomato growers. In this case the producers of tomatoes 
for processing are integrated into the decoupled payment regime, on the basis of historical 
references. The new market organisation will come to effect in marketing year 2008/09. 
 The growers of tomatoes for processing as well as the processors have expressed 
their concerns over the reform. 'The Spanish government has defended an anticipation of 
the reform in order to minimize farmer losses due to subsidy cuts associated to over-
production in recent years' (USDA-FAS, 2006).  
2.5 Conclusion 
The processing tomato supply chain is a large sector in the Mediterranean countries and to 
a lesser extent in new member economies such as Poland and Hungary. The production of 
processing tomatoes still grows fast, notably in Spain and Italy. Processing tomatoes are 
produced on relatively large farms specialised in extensive production of arable crops and 
vegetables. The subsidies involved in support of the processing tomato supply chain are 
substantial: a budget of 300 million euro amounting to 50% of producer turnover. Both the 
1978 and the 2001 subsidy schemes are associated with substantial overproduction. Actual 
expenses in 2005/06 and 2006/07 (380 and 360 million euro respectively) exceed the EU 
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budget by far. The 1978 regime did not promote supply chain concentration: production 
and processing remained small-scale. The 2001 regime, on the other hand, led to concen-
tration at the processing level except for Italy.  
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3. Substitution elasticities horticulture  
 
 
 
In this section, we determine the price elasticities of supply and the substitution elasticities 
that we will use in the simulation studies analysed in the next section. Section 3.1 gives a 
brief literature review. Section 3.2 presents the results of the estimations of the land equa-
tions modeled in HORTUS. Section 3.3 gives the results of the estimations of a more gen-
eral system of land equations for Italy. Section 3.4 concludes.  
3.1 Literature review 
For agriculture (arable farming), substitution elasticities have been calculated in a number 
of studies in the mid-1990s in order to determine the effects of decoupling (see among oth-
ers Guyomard, Baudry and Carpentier (1996); Oude Lansink and Peerlings (1996) and 
Moro and Schokai (1999)). These studies use production (duality) theory to determine the 
substitution elasticities. Guyomard et al. (1996), for instance, find own price elasticities of 
land allocation between 0.20% (sunflowers) and 1.27% (maize). If the prize of maize rises 
with 1%, maize (sunflower) acreage rises with 1.27% (0.20%). The studies also report 
cross price elasticities of land allocation.  
 These studies also investigate to what extent decoupled payments still exert produc-
tion effects. In general, these studies conclude that decoupling is not perfect. Area pay-
ments still have production effects.  
Oude Lansink (2001) is (about) the only study available for vegetables production. 
Table 3.1 presents the own and cross price elasticties of supply estimated by Oude Lansink 
(2001). Tomatoes, cucumbers and peppers are complements, whereas other vegetables are 
substitutes for tomatoes, cucumbers and peppers. This implies that a rise in the tomato 
price leads to more supply of tomatoes, cucumbers and peppers at the detrimental of all 
other vegetables in greenhouse horticulture (and all other output). The price elasticities of 
supply found are small and comparable with the ones found for arable farming: 0.26-
0.91%.  
Table 3.1 Price elasticities of supply for Dutch greenhouse horticulture  
 Tomatoes Cucumbers Peppers Other  
vegetables 
Other 
Outputs 
Tomatoes 0.28 0.04 0.04 -0.16 -0.28 
Cucumbers 0.13 0.91 0.14 -0.24 -0.04 
Peppers 0.14 0.16 0.26 -0.24 0.13 
Other vegetables -0.29 -0.14 -0.14 0.47 0.36 
Other outputs -6.85 -0.34 0.92 4.68 6.79 
Source: Oude Lansink (2001). 
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3.2 Estimating substitution elasticities for HORTUS 
Calculating price elasticities of supply on basis of production theory is labour and data in-
tensive. Since we derived specific supply equations in HORTUS (Bunte and Van Galen 
2005), we restricted ourselves to estimating these equations (see Appendix A).  
 For this purpose, we collected data on production, acreage and grower prices from 
Eurostat for the Netherlands and Italy. The demand for land has been estimated using 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SURE). The equations do not model cross price elastic-
ities in detail, but model acreage allocation as a function of the development of the own 
price versus the development of a price index for a relevant group: fruits, protected crops, 
et cetera. Table 3.2 gives the results for the Netherlands. The substitution elasticity for pro-
tected crops is 0.30%. This implies that if the tomato price rises 1% above the group index, 
tomato acreage will rise by 0.30% (and as result cucumber and pepper acreage will fall).1 
Supply substitution between apples and pears and between carrots and beans is more 
common than in intensive vegetables production. Supply substitution may be low in inten-
sive vegetables production, because production knowledge and climate and soil conditions 
and requirements may be very product specific. The substitution elasticity between the four 
product groups equals 0.24 (see Appendix 1). This elasticity is lower than the within-group 
substitution elasticities except for vegetables from intensive vegetable production in the 
open. Intergroup substitution elasticities may be expected to be lower than intragroup sub-
stitution elasticities. It is easier to change from cucumber to pepper production than to ap-
ple production. This characteristic is assumed and required in models based on the 
Armington-relation such as GTAP.  
Table 3.2 Substitution elasticities for the Netherlands  
Product group Products Elasticity 
Fruit Apples, Pears 0.88 
Protected crops Tomatoes, Cucumbers, Peppers 0.30 
Intensive vegetables production in the open 
- Horticulture 
Asparagus, Cabbage, Cauliflower, Lettuce, 
Strawberries  
0.18 
Extensive vegetables production in the 
open - Arable farming 
Beans, Carrots 0.98 
 
 
Table 3.3 shows the results for Italy for three product categories. We did not estimate 
the substitution elasticity for protected crops due to data limitations.  
- Fruits 
The substitution elasticity for fruits for Italy is lower (0.37) than the one for the 
Netherlands (0.88). This result may be due to the fact that in Italy fruit refers to a 
more heterogeneous product group, including citrus and dessert grapes;  
                                                 
1 In HORTUS, tomatoes, cucumbers and peppers are substitutes rather than complements by definition (see 
and compare Oude Lansink 2001). Within a group of products, at least two products are substitutes in pro-
duction. Because, we do not identity other protected vegetables and other protected output in HORTUS, to-
matoes, cucumbers and peppers are also bound to be substitutes in production (see Oude Lansink, 2001). 
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- Horticulture 
The substitution elasticity for intensive vegetables production (0.08) is somewhat 
smaller than it is in the Netherlands (0.18); 
- Arable farming 
The substitution elasticity for extensive vegetables production (0.12) is substantial 
lower than it is in the Dutch case, among other things due to the fact that the group 
includes more products for Italy. Inclusion of tomatoes in this group did not give sat-
isfactory results. The substitution elasticity became negative. In the next section, we 
discuss results for (processing) tomatoes.  
 
The substitution elasticity between the three product groups equals 0.12 (see Appen-
dix 1). This elasticity is lower than the within-group substitution elasticities for fruits, 
equal to the one for vegetables from arable farming and again higher than the one for vege-
tables from horticulture.  
Table 3.3 Substitution elasticities for Italy 
Product group Products Elasticity 
Fruit Apples, cherries, citrus, grapes, pears 0.37 
Intensive vegetables production in the open 
- Horticulture 
Asparagus, cauliflower, cucumbers, lettuce, 
strawberries  
0.08 
Extensive vegetables production in the 
open - Arable farming 
Beans, carrots, onions, potatoes 0.12 
3.3 Price elasticities in more general land allocation systems 
Table 3.4 gives the (cross) price elasticities of land for a more general system of land allo-
cation. Table 3.4 refers to vegetables and arable products, the closest substitutes in produc-
tion of tomatoes. Unfortunately, we do not have a subdivision of fresh and processing 
tomatoes. The own price elasticity of land - the diagonal in the table - equals 0.03-0.25% 
and is fairly small. The cross price elasticities suggest that cereals and tomatoes are com-
plementary products.1 A rise in the cereal price with 1% leads to a rise in tomato acreage of 
0.07%; a rise in the tomato price leads to a rise in cereal acreage of 0.03%. Intensive vege-
tables production, on the other hand, is a substitute of tomato production.2 The table illus-
trates that (fresh) tomatoes and crops from intensive horticultural production (asparagus, 
cauliflower, cucumbers, lettuce and strawberries) are substitutes in supply. However, the 
table also suggests that (processing) tomatoes are complementary to some arable crops and 
substitutable to others. A rise in the tomato price of 1% leads to a fall of 0.09% of the area 
allocated to extensive vegetables production (beans, carrots, onions and potatoes), of 
0.10% of the area allocated to intensive vegetables production (asparagus, cauliflower, cu-
cumbers, lettuce and strawberries) and of 0.28% of the area allocated to other industrial 
crops (oil seeds, sugar beets and tobacco). Note that a reduction in the production subsidy 
                                                 
1 The sign is positive.  
2 The sign is negative. 
 31
will lead to a fall in tomato prices and to a rise in the area allocated to vegetables and other 
industrial crops.  
Table 3.4 Own and cross price elasticities for land use of selected crops for Italy  
Price of:     Demand for land for: 
Cereals Tomatoes Vegetables - 
Arable 
Vegetables -  
Horticulture 
Other crops 
Cereals 0,04 0,03 0,01 -0,08 -0,01 
Tomatoes 0,07 0,25 0,07 -0,17 0,02 
Vegetables - Arable 0,38 -0,09 0,16 -0,36 -0,03 
Vegetables - Horticulture -0,08 -0,10 -0,04 0,03 0,03 
Other crops -0,27 -0,28 -0,12 0,69 0,06 
Numbers in italics refer to significance at the 5% level.  
3.4 Conclusion  
This section shows that there is important supply substitution between tomatoes on the one 
hand and both vegetables and arable crops on the other hand. This result again underlines 
that it is important to consider possible supply substitution from processing tomatoes to-
wards extensive vegetables production and arable crops.  
This section also finds small substitution elasticities within product groups - the elas-
ticities in table 3.2 and 3.3 - and even smaller substitution elasticities between product 
groups: 0.24 for the Netherlands and 0.12 for Italy. The elasticities found will be used in 
the simulations discussed in the next section. 
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4. Simulation analysis 
 
 
 
In this section we illustrate what the likely impact of a change in the subsidy for processing 
tomatoes will be on production and trade in fruits and vegetables in the European Union. 
The report analyses two possible reforms: (I) a reduction or even an abolishment of the 
production subsidy per tonne; and (II) the introduction of area payments (decoupling). We 
present the results of the simulation analysis carried out using HORTUS: LEI's supply and 
demand model for production and trade in fruits and vegetables in the European Union. In 
section 4.1 we discuss the assumptions made in defining the scenarios analysed. In section 
4.2 we present the results of the simulation analysis for scenario I: reduction of production 
subsidies. In Section 4.3 we present the results for scenario II: replacement of production 
subsidies by area payments. Section 4.4 concludes.  
4.1 Assumptions  
In the framework of the evaluation of the CMO for fruits and vegetables, the European Un-
ion considers amending the subsidy regime for processing tomatoes. The production sub-
sidy will be reduced and possibly replaced by an area, a lump sum or an equivalent 
payment. Payments to processing tomato growers will be decoupled. In this context, we 
will analyse the following scenarios:  
I. the abolishment of the production subsidy without a compensation in terms of an 
area, lump sum or any equivalent payment;  
II the abolishment of the production subsidy with partial compensation in terms of an 
area, lump sum or any equivalent payment. The area payment is assumed to prescribe 
the allocation of some land to the production of processing tomatoes in order to pre-
vent unfair competition for growers of other vegetables, fruit and arable crops.  
 
Other scenarios are possible as well. However, we think that these two scenarios give 
a good first impression of the likely effects of a subsidy reduction and decoupling. It is 
relatively straightforward to consider other magnitudes in the changes applied to the policy 
variables, because HORTUS is made up of linear relations. For this reason, we stick to two 
scenarios. By the way, scenario (II) only makes sense when decoupling is imperfect. If de-
coupling is perfect, i.e. if there is no relation between current production and government 
payments, scenario (II) coincides with scenario (I).  
In terms of parameters, there are four main assumptions to be made in the simulation 
analysis to be carried out:  
1. how big is the grower subsidy for processing tomatoes in percentage terms? 
2. how price elastic is the demand for European processed tomatoes? And how price 
elastic is the supply of European fruits and vegetables? 
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3. given the fact that processing tomatoes are primarily grown on arable farms, what 
implications does the change in the CMO have for the total area cultivated with fruits 
and vegetables? 
4. to what extent does the future CMO decouple the relation between subsidies and pro-
duction?  
 
Grower subsidies 
In 2001-2003, the average grower price for processing tomatoes was approximately 67 
euro per tonne (FADN). The subsidy amounts to 34.50 euro per tonne. This implies that 
the subsidy equals roughly fifty percent of the grower price. We assume that the subsidy 
equals fifty percent of the grower price. This accords with estimations made in the litera-
ture.  
 
Demand and supply substitution 
We assume that the price elasticity of the demand for processed tomatoes is low. This is a 
fairly reasonable assumption. In general, the price elasticity of the demand for food is low. 
In general, the price elasticity of intermediates with a low cost share is low as well. A price 
elasticity of demand of -0.1% or -0.2% seems reasonable. The estimations are based on a 
price elasticity of -0.2% implying that if consumer prices rise with 1% demand falls with 
0.2%. European production is sheltered from international competition due to transporta-
tion costs, differences in standards and attitudes towards genetically modified raw inputs 
(Pritchard and Burch, 2003). Rickard (2003) argues that there are three geographical mar-
kets in the world for processing tomatoes: the Americas, Europe and the Mediterranean, 
and the Far East. Turkey (and to some extent) China are the only serious competitors for 
the European tomato processing industry. Our Italian consultant, on the other hand, indi-
cates that Italian representatives of producer organisations and the processing industry ex-
pect imports from non-EU countries to rise substantially in the long run. In the short run, 
Spain is likely to expand its market share. For the moment, we assume that the substitution 
elasticity between processing tomatoes from the various countries of origin (exporters) is 
low (1.25%). A substitution elasticity of 1.25% implies that if prices of imports from Italy 
grow with 1% above the overall import price index, imports from Italy fall with 1.25%.  
 On basis of the analysis in the previous section, the following assumptions are made 
with respect to the substitution elasticities between the crops identified in HORTUS. The 
substitution elasticity between the three main products - fruits, protected vegetables and 
vegetables in the open - is low (0.10). A substitution elasticity of 0.10% implies that if 
grower prices for e.g. fruit grow with 1% above the overall grower price index, the fruit 
area will grow with 0.10%. The within group elasticity is substantially higher. For fruits, 
we assume that the within group substitution elasticity is higher in North Europe than in 
the Mediterranean, in accordance with the results obtained in the previous section, because 
North European fruit production depends on a few close substitutes (apples, pears, cher-
ries, plums, et cetera) while Mediterranean fruit production is more diversified. Fruit pro-
duction in the Mediterranean includes citrus, peaches and dessert grapes. For vegetables, 
we assume that the substitution elasticity equals 0.30 for protected crops as established for 
the Netherlands and 0.60 for vegetables in the open which is approximately the average of 
the values found for Italy and the Netherlands.  
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Table 4.1 Supply substitution elasticities employed  
Region Countries Substitution 
Elasticity 
  Fruit Protected 
crops 
Crops in the 
open 
North Europe Baltic states, Belgium, Ireland,  
Netherlands, Scandinavia, UK 
0.9 0.3 0.6 
Central Europe Austria, Czech Republic, France,  
Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovak  
Republic  
0.6 0.3 0.6 
Mediterranean and  
Rest of the world 
Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, Rest 
of the World  
0.3 0.3 0.6 
 
 
Total land employed in fruits and vegetables production  
Processing tomatoes are grown on arable farms in rotation with crops like cereals, oil seeds 
and other industrial crops. A reduction in the subsidy for processing tomatoes is likely to 
have a first order effect on the land allocated to cereals, oil seeds, and other industrial 
crops. In Italy, 100,000 hectares are allocated to processing tomatoes and 2,000,000 hec-
tares to all fruits and vegetables.1 A shift of land from processing tomatoes of say 10,000 
hectares to cereals, oil seeds and other industrial crops implies a decrease in the total area 
employed in fruits and vegetables production of 0.5%. For reasons of simplicity, one might 
neglect such a reduction, certainly in the light of the results to be presented below.  
 
Decoupling 
Decoupling policies eliminate the relation between the subsidy and current production. 
However, in reality, decoupling may be imperfect and promote production as such - simply 
by granting subsidies - or favour particular crops.  
In the empirical literature, there is an intense debate with respect to the question to 
what extent decoupled government payments really are decoupled (Guyomard et al., 1996; 
Oude Lansink and Peerlings, 1996; Moro and Sckokai, 1999; Gohin and Guyomard, 2000 
and Gullstrand, 2003). To what extent do these payments promote agricultural production 
as such? To what extent do they promote the production of particular crops? This discus-
sion is among other things due to the fact that there are two definitions of decoupling 
(Andersson, 2004): 
1. the ex ante definition examines whether policies fulfil the WTO decoupling criteria 
and classifies policies meeting this criteria as being decoupled. The subsidy criteria 
should be clearly defined and apply to a well-defined base period. Payments are not 
to be based on the size of any variable - in particular input, output and prices - in any 
other year than the base year. Production should not be obligatory; 
                                                 
1 Including all fruits and vegetables for the food processing industry (grapes for wine production, olives for 
olive oil production, et cetera).  
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2. the ex post definition examines (empirically) whether policies exert production ef-
fects and classifies policies as being decoupled on basis of (empirical) measurements. 
In theory, area payments imply decoupling. However, area payments may promote 
agricultural production as such by discouraging farm exit. Moreover, the conditions 
to be met in order to receive the area payments, may favour the production of one 
crop over another. Area payments may exclude the choice of certain crops.  
 
The empirical literature indicates that area payments which are decoupled according 
to definition 1 may not be decoupled according to definition 2 (Moro and Sckokai, 1999; 
Gohin and Guyomard, 2000; Gullstrand, 2003 and Andersson, 2004). There are several 
reasons why WTO-proof area payments may have production effects. Area payments give 
a minimum income to farmers. This may reduce farmers' risk perceptions and increase 
banks' willingness to grant loans, et cetera. Both aspects may influence decisions to invest 
and to stay in business, for instance. 
 In order to assess the effects of possible decoupling initiatives with respect to proc-
essing tomatoes, one should take into account that even decoupled subsidies may be asso-
ciated with production incentives. We assume this to be the case. If not, scenario II would 
coincide with scenario I. 
4.2 The impact of a reduction in the production subsidy  
This section presents the impact of abolishing the production subsidy for processing toma-
toes. The results have been obtained from HORTUS: a partial equilibrium model for fruit 
and vegetables production, consumption and trade in the EU25 (Bunte et al., 2005). 
HORTUS is a static model. The model indicates that production, consumption and trade at 
time T are at point A - the base year - and will be in point B at some time T+X in the fu-
ture. The model does not give information about the dynamics of the changes, about how 
the sector gets from point A at time T to point B at time T+X. The model also does not say 
anything about any possible underlying trends (developments) in production, consumption 
and trade. The model gives information about a shift from one trend to another trend with-
out indicating anything about the possible trends themselves.  
The abolishment of the production subsidy causes an upward shift of the supply func-
tion of processing tomatoes. Growers of processing tomatoes will shift their acreage to 
other crops in their cropping plan. They will grow processing tomatoes less often provided 
scale economies allows them to produce at lower prices. Mechanisation of harvesting ac-
tivities, for example, may play a relevant role in lowering costs and may make the differ-
ence between continuing the production of processing tomatoes or not. Assuming more or 
less constant returns to scale in agriculture and a price inelastic demand for processing to-
matoes, the abolishment of the production subsidy will be met by an increase in the prices 
the processors pay for processing tomatoes (Table 4.2).1 2 Grower prices fall slightly. 
                                                 
1 In the model, grower prices rise (fall) if output rises (falls) much faster than the area employed does. How-
ever, in this case, the area used for the production of processing tomatoes falls with production.  
2 Tomato growers and processors are price takers. The price of final products is fixed due to market competi-
tion among producers and processors, both national and international, between processors and retail chains, 
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Given the elasticities chosen, the demand for (European) processing tomatoes and thus the 
output of the tomato processing industry will fall by approximately 15% in Greece, Portu-
gal and Spain and by more than 30% in Cyprus and Italy. For France, Hungary, Malta and 
Poland, we find intermediate numbers for the production decrease. Turkey and the Rest of 
the World will be able to increase imports into the EU and as a result their production. 
European production will, of course, fall more sharply and non-European production will 
rise more substantially if higher elasticities of import substitution would be employed.  
Table 4. 2 The impact of scenario I on the processing tomato supply chain (percentage changes) 
 Input prices of processing industry 
Grower prices Hectares Output / 
Industry demand 
Cyprus 49.8 -0.2 -31.8 -31.8 
France 49.9 -0.1 -18.5 -18.5 
Greece 49.5 -0.5 -14.2 -14.2 
Hungary 49.6 -0.4 -23.8 -23.8 
Italy 48.6 -1.4 -36.5 -36.5 
Malta 49.5 -0.5 -26.7 -26.7 
Poland 49.8 -0.2 -24.3 -24.3 
Portugal 49.6 -0.5 -15.7 -15.7 
Spain 49.7 -0.3 -14.7 -14.7 
     
Morocco - -0.1 0.7 0.7 
Turkey - 0.0 4.0 4.0 
ROW - 0.0 10.6 10.6 
 
 
 Table 4.2 suggests that Italy (and Cyprus) will face the largest drop in output of proc-
essing tomatoes. Italy is a large importer, exporter and re-exporter and will face a surge in 
imports from the Rest of the World in its home market. Italy is also by far the largest ex-
porter to non-EU countries and faces a major decrease in its exports to these markets. For 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and to a lesser extent France, domestic demand is the most impor-
tant driving factor. This shelters their domestic production to some extent.  
 What is even more important is the fact that agricultural production will lead to a 
production shift in the direction in which the Mediterranean countries have a comparative 
advantage: fruits and fruit vegetables (fresh tomatoes, cucumbers and sweet peppers). In 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, the area allocated to fruit and fruit vegetables grows moder-
ately by 0.2-1.0%. In Italy, the area allocated to fruit and fruit vegetables grows by 1.6-
1.8% (see Table 4.4). Because the demand for processing tomatoes falls and arable produc-
tion in general becomes less attractive due to the fall in the grower price of one of its main 
crops (processing tomatoes), growers will switch from arable crops and extensive vegeta-
bles production to fruits and fruit vegetables. This makes a possible fall in the total area 
                                                                                                                                                    
and due to the low level of product differentiation. However, even though producers and processors are price 
takers, this does not imply that producers and processors are not able to pass on cost increases. Cost increases 
follow from entry and exit processes.  
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employed in fruits and vegetables production unlikely, on the contrary, and gives a spur to 
the general shift from arable to fruits and vegetables production in Europe (EC, 2004).  
As a result of the growth in Mediterranean fruit production, North European coun-
tries will face fiercer competition in the production of fruits and fruit vegetables. The 
Mediterranean countries will crowd out North European fruit production. This will lead to 
a shift to vegetables production in North Europe. This also holds for the Netherlands. 
Table 4.3 Import developments for processing tomatoes under scenario I (percentage changes)  
Importer:       Exporter: 
France Germany Netherlands Poland ROW UK 
Cyprus -22.9 -25.5 -24.7 -32.1 -61.2 -34.0 
France  -25.6 -24.8 -32.1 -61.3 -34.1 
Greece -22.5 -25.2 -24.4 -31.7 -60.8 -33.6 
Hungary -22.6 -25.3 -24.5 -31.8 -61.0 -33.8 
Italy -21.4 -24.0 -23.2 -30.5 -59.7 -32.5 
Malta -22.5 -25.2 -24.4 -31.7 -60.9 -33.7 
Poland -22.9 -25.6 -24.7  -61.2 -34.0 
Portugal -22.5 -25.2 -24.4 -31.7 -60.9 -33.7 
Spain -22.7 -25.4 -24.6 -31.9 -61.1 -33.9 
Morocco 39.5 36.8 37.6 30.3 1.2 28.3 
Turkey 39.4 36.7 37.6 30.2 1.1 28.3 
ROW 39.4 36.7 37.5 30.2 1.0 28.2 
Table 4.4 Area development in Europe under scenario 1 (percentage changes)  
 Fruit Vegetables in the open Fruit vegetables 
Mediterranean 0.8 -3.7 1.2 
Greece 0.6 -2.7 0.5 
Italy 1.6 -5.2 1.8 
Portugal 0.4 -2.2 0.9 
Spain 0.2 -1.3 0.4 
Rest of Europe 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Netherlands -0.3 0.1 0.1 
Rest of the world -0.1 0.1 0.0 
 
 
In terms of total acreage, the impact of a reduction in the subsidy for processing to-
matoes on Dutch horticulture is limited. However, the market share of the Netherlands on 
its main export markets - Germany and the UK- will decrease. More in particular, we may 
observe the following changes in bilateral international trade patterns (see table 4.5). 
- Italy will increase its exports of fresh fruits and vegetables to Germany and the UK 
substantially. This holds in particular for its exports of fruit vegetables to Germany 
and all its exports to the UK. This holds less so for its fruit exports to Germany; 
- Greece, Spain, but also Portugal will experience minor increases of their exports of 
fresh vegetables to Germany and the UK. Their exports of fresh fruits to Germany 
decline somewhat; 
 38 
- Dutch fresh fruit exports are relatively hard hit. Dutch exports of fresh vegetables to 
Germany - including fresh tomatoes - may also decrease somewhat. The Netherlands 
will lose market share in the German and British market because Italy and the other 
Mediterranean countries will increase their exports while Dutch exports will more or 
less remain constant.  
Table 4.5 Changes in German and British imports by exporter under scenario I (percentage changes) 
  Germany  UK  
  Greece Italy Netherlands Spain Greece Italy Netherlands Spain 
Apples 0.0 4.6 -1.5 -1.0 1.3 5.9 -0.2 0.4 
Citrus 1.0 5.5  0.0 1.7 6.3  0.7 
Grapes -0.7 3.8  -1.7 1.6 6.1  0.6 
Pears -0.9 3.6 -2.4 -1.9 0.9 5.5 -0.6 -0.1 
         
Cucumbers 1.6 6.1 0.0 0.6 1.6 6.1 0.1 0.6 
Peppers 1.5 6.1 0.0 0.5 1.7 6.2 0.2 0.7 
Tomatoes 1.2 5.7 -0.3 0.2 1.6 6.1 0.0 0.6 
         
Onions 0.9 5.5 -0.6 -0.1 1.6 6.1 0.1 0.6 
Other vegetables 0.9 5.4 -0.6 -0.1 1.7 6.2 0.2 0.7 
 
 
To conclude, the reduction in the production of processing tomatoes is partly com-
pensated by the increase in the production of other fruits and vegetables. Grower prices of 
processing tomatoes decrease somewhat (table 4.2). Grower prices of other fruit and vege-
tables also fall because there is more land available for their production. Land prices fall in 
all European countries implying that fruit and vegetables production becomes more exten-
sive. 
4.3 The impact of decoupling  
In this section, we discuss the impact of a subsidy reduction plus the introduction of area 
payments. We assume that area payments prescribe the allocation of some land to process-
ing tomatoes in order to prevent unfair competition with producers of other vegetables, 
fruits and arable crops. The impact of area payments is modelled by assuming that the land 
allocation in the countries producing processing tomatoes adjusts partially to the price in-
centives implied by the subsidy reduction.  
Land allocation adjusts partially to the price incentives implied by the reduction in 
the production subsidy and the associated fall in demand. Because land allocation does not 
adjust fully to the price incentives a gap arises between area and output developments. 
Output falls much harder than land (table 4.6). Because land use for processing tomatoes 
becomes more extensive, growers of processing tomatoes will employ less labour and capi-
tal. The resulting reduction in capital and labour costs will lead to a fall in grower prices 
due to sharp product competition. 
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Table 4. 6  The impact of scenario II on the processing tomato supply chain (percentage changes) 
 Input prices of processing industry 
Grower prices Hectares Output / 
Industry demand 
Cyprus 32.2 -17.8 -14.2 -17.7 
France 35.2 -14.8 -11.8 -14.7 
Greece 35.3 -14.7 -9.5 -12.5 
Hungary 33.3 -16.7 -12.8 -16.2 
Italy 27.5 -22.5 -15.0 -19.5 
Malta 32.0 -18.0 -14.3 -17.9 
Poland 33.4 -16.6 -13.1 -16.4 
Portugal 34.8 -15.2 -10.4 -13.4 
Spain 36.4 -13.6 -9.9 -12.6 
     
Morocco - 0.0 0.4 0.4 
Turkey - 0.0 2.5 2.5 
ROW - 0.0 6.0 6.0 
 
 
The basic difference between scenario I and scenario II is that under scenario I, 
growers of tomato processors are able to shift the burden of the price reduction to the pro-
ducers of other crops by switching crops. In scenario II, the burden of the fall in grower 
prices falls primarily upon the growers of processing tomatoes (table 4.7). 
Table 4.7 Grower price under scenario I and II (percentage changes) 
 Greece Italy Portugal Spain 
Scenario I II I II I II I II 
Apples -0.5 -0.1 -1.4 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.0 
Bananas -0.5 0.0 -1.4 -0.7 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.0 
Citrus -0.5 -0.1 -1.4 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.0 
Cucumbers -0.5 -0.2 -1.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 
Grapes -0.5 -0.1 -1.4 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 
Onions -0.5 -1.1 -1.4 -1.3 -0.5 -0.9 -0.3 -0.4 
Other fruits -0.5 -0.1 -1.4 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.0 
Other vegetables -0.5 -1.1 -1.4 -1.4 -0.5 -0.9 -0.3 -0.4 
Pears -0.5 -0.1 -1.4 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.0 
Peppers -0.5 -0.3 -1.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 
Tomatoes fresh -0.5 -0.3 -1.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 
Tomatoes processing -0.5 -14.7 -1.4 -22.5 -0.5 -15.2 -0.3 -13.6 
 
 
 The partial adjustment in land allocation and the impact on grower prices have major 
consequences for growers' substitution behaviour in the Mediterranean area. Growers of 
processing tomatoes will switch to arable crops and extensive vegetables production rather 
than fruits and fruit vegetables. Growers of processing tomatoes remain stuck in the pro-
duction of arable crops and extensive vegetables and within this category they switch to 
products like onions, carrots and potatoes, but probably also to cereals, sugar beets and oil 
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seeds.1 As a result of this lack of substitution behaviour in the Mediterranean area, North 
Europe is hardly influenced at all (see table 4.8). If production in North Europe is influ-
enced at all, this refers to vegetables in the open.   
Table 4.8 Area development in Europe under scenario 1I (percentage changes)  
 Fruit Vegetables in the open Processing tomatoes Fruit vegetables 
Mediterranean 0.4 1.3 -13.0 0.4 
 Greece 0.4 1.4 -9.5 0.3 
 Italy 0.7 2.0 -15.0 0.6 
 Portugal 0.3 1.1 -10.4 0.2 
 Spain 0.1 0.6 -9.9 0.1 
Rest of Europe 0.0 0.0 -12.4 0.0 
 Netherlands 0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.2 
Rest of the world 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.0 
4.4 Conclusion  
A reduction in the production subsidy for processing tomatoes is likely to lead to a rise in 
the price tomato processors pay for raw tomatoes. This is especially likely if there are no 
substantial returns to scale in tomato production, and if the price elasticity of demand for 
European processing tomatoes is low. The rise in the price of processing tomatoes will lead 
to a fall in the demand for European processing tomatoes of 15-35 per cent given the as-
sumptions made with respect to the price elasticity of demand and the substitution elastic-
ities between exporters. There is discussion on this point.  
More importantly, the reduction in the production subsidy will lead to a shift in 
Mediterranean agriculture from extensive arable and vegetables production to fruits and 
fruit vegetables. Mediterranean production of fruits and fruits vegetables will crowd out 
(replace) North European production of fruits and fruit vegetables. As a result, North 
European producers will switch to the production of other vegetables. Dutch fruit exporters 
will lose market share on their export markets to their South European competitors. To a 
lesser extent this also holds for Dutch (fruit) vegetables exporters.  
If the reduction in the production subsidy for processing tomatoes is replaced by area 
payments, land allocation in the Mediterranean will be stuck in processing tomatoes. As a 
result, grower prices for processing tomatoes will fall substantially and there will hardly be 
any substitution to other crops. In this case, Mediterranean growers are likely to substitute 
to arable crops and extensive vegetables. The impact on North European production will be 
minor.  
                                                 
1 Note that arable crops are not included in the model.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
 
 
In 2006-2007, the European Union evaluates and possibly amends the Common Market 
Organisation (CMO) for fruits and vegetables. One of the principal elements of the current 
CMO is a production subsidy for processing tomatoes. The European Union considers re-
ducing and decoupling the subsidy for processing tomatoes. The Dutch Ministry of Agri-
culture requested LEI to evaluate what the likely impact is of these changes on production 
and trade patterns for fruits and vegetables in the EU.  
The report comes to the following findings:  
- processing tomatoes are primarily grown on arable farms in rotation with crops such 
as cereals, oil seeds and other industrial crops such as sugar beets. So, from an agro-
nomic perspective, one may expect a reduction in the subsidy for processing toma-
toes to lead to a shift to other crops on arable farms such as cereals; 
- the subsidy on processing tomatoes amounts to fifty percent of the grower price. The 
price effects of a change in the subsidy regime may be large. This implies that the 
stakes for the Mediterranean processing tomato industry are substantial.  
 
More specifically, the report comes to findings for two scenarios: (I) the abolishment 
of the production subsidy for processing tomatoes; and (II) the abolishment of the produc-
tion subsidy plus the introduction of a compensating area payment. The area payments are 
assumed to prescribe the allocation of some land to processing tomatoes in order to prevent 
unfair competition with growers of other vegetables, fruits and arable crops. Scenario I 
comes to the following conclusions:  
- the reduction in the production subsidy is likely to be passed through into higher in-
put prices for tomato processors. Input prices may rise with fifty percent. Grower 
prices will decrease to some extent (0-2%); 
- demand for European processing tomatoes will fall with 15% in Greece, Portugal and 
Spain and more than 35% in Italy. The fall in demand may be compensated by the 
current growth in the demand for processing tomatoes. Demand for European proc-
essing tomatoes may fall harder, if imports from non-European production areas rise 
faster. Rickard (2003) indicates that the European market is sheltered from interna-
tional competition due to transport costs. Italian experts expect non-European pro-
ducers to be able to expand their exports to the EU substantially in the long run; 
- the subsidy reduction will make not only the production of processing tomatoes less 
attractive, but also the production of other arable crops. As a result, Mediterranean 
farmers will switch production from arable crops and extensive vegetables to fruits 
and fruit vegetables. This result contrasts and complements the agronomic perspec-
tive posited above. One qualification need to be made in this respect. Mediterranean 
farmers may, of course, at least in theory, also switch to products not in the model 
such as meat and dairy production; 
 42 
- in North European fruit markets, Mediterranean exporters crowd out domestic pro-
ducers and other exporters. As a result, North European growers switch from fruit to 
vegetables production. This also holds for the Netherlands.  
If the abolishment of the production subsidy is compensated by area payments, the 
above results change into the following results:  
- grower prices fall substantially. Even though demand for processing tomatoes will 
fall substantially, Mediterranean growers will not adjust their land allocation fully (in 
order to collect area payments). The area allocated to processing tomatoes will fall by 
only 10-15%. Production of processing tomatoes, however, will diminish by 12-20%. 
They will produce more extensively and reduce capital and labour input. Grower 
prices will fall sharply with production costs. The burden of falling producer prices 
falls on growers of processing tomatoes only and is not shared by other producers of 
other crops as is the case in scenario I; 
- mediterranean growers switch to vegetables in the open (and probably also to arable 
crops). They also switch to some extent to fruits and fruit vegetables. North European 
production is hardly influenced.  
 
Basically, the paper stresses that the Mediterranean countries have a comparative ad-
vantage in the production of fruits and fruit vegetables rather than arable crops among 
which processing tomatoes. A reduction in the production subsidy for processing tomatoes 
will lead to a shift in production in the Mediterranean towards this advantage. Possible re-
ductions in possible subsidies related to fruit production may countervail this development 
to some extent. In policy terms, processing tomatoes are the Mediterranean's defensive in-
terests and fruits and fruit vegetables the Mediterranean's offensive interests. The produc-
tion loss in horticulture and food processing for processing tomatoes will be compensated 
by other products. Of course, some production regions may face important adaptation 
costs. Area payments with restrictions on land use countervail the development towards 
comparative advantage. Area payments lower the adjustment burden for growers of proc-
essing tomatoes but at the cost of lower grower prices.  
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Appendix 1. Estimating substitution elasticities 
The Appendix gives a more elaborate overview of the estimations carried out to estimate 
the substitution elasticities. The first part refers to estimation of the land equations derived 
in HORTUS. The second part refers to a more general system of input (land) demand equa-
tions.  
 
The HORTUS model  
 
HORTUS models acreage allocation as follows:  
 ( )py −+−+= pyHAha jjj τ          (1) 
 
Where 
 
haj = area used in production of crop j  
yj = production of crop j  
pj = price of crop j  
HA = total acreage available for all crops j 
y = index of production of all crops j 
p = index of prices of all crops j 
 
More generally, equation (1) can be written as:  
 
εαpααyαHAααha 5j43j210j ++++++= py       (2) 
 
Where the α's represent parameters to be estimated. HORTUS derives theoretical expecta-
tions with respect to the parameters in term of their sign and even their size. The coeffi-
cients of HA, y and yj are predetermined. Since estimation of equation (2) without prior 
restrictions is time consuming, we estimated equation (2) with the a priori restrictions im-
plied by equation (1).  
The acreage allocation equation is estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
(SURE). The equations are corrected for auto-regression whenever appropriate.  
The results of the estimations are given by Table A1.1.  
In HORTUS, the coefficient equals the substitution elasticity. In terms of equation 1, 
the coefficient has the following interpretation. If the price of lettuce rises 1% faster than 
the price index for vegetables in the open, the lettuce area will increase with 0.88% (at the 
detriment of some of the other vegetables in the open). The results suggest that substitution 
is important between apples and pears; and between vegetables in the open cultivated in 
arable farming. Substitution between vegetables in the open cultivated on horticultural 
farms is less common due to the large variety of different crops produced (lettuce, straw-
berries, asparagus, cabbage). Production knowledge and differences in soil and climate re-
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quirements and availability are probably more product specific than for the other sub-
groups.  
Table A1.1 Estimation results for the Netherlands: intragroup elasticities 
  Coefficient: 
Substitution 
Elasticity 
Standard  
Error 
Rho DW coefficient 
Fruit Apple 0.88 0.0304 n.a. 2.30 
 Pear 0.88 0.0304 n.a. 2.23 
Cucumbers 0.30 0.0566 1.00 2.20 Fruit 
vegetables Tomatoes 0.30 0.0566 1.00 2.12 
Beans 0.98 0.0086 n.a. 1.80 Vegetables  
in the open I - 
Arable farming 
Carrots 0.98 0.0086 n.a. 1.92 
Asparagus 0.18 0.0064 0.51 0.87 
Cabbage 0.18 0.0064 0.30 1.91 
Cauliflower 0.18 0.0064 0.33 1.35 
Lettuce  0.18 0.0064 0.02 2.10 
Vegetables  
in the open II -
Horticulture 
Strawberry 0.18 0.0064 0.21 1.81 
n.a. = not applied. 
Table A1.2 Estimation results for the Netherlands: intergroup elasticities 
 Coefficient: 
Substitution 
Elasticity 
Standard Error Rho DW coefficient 
Fruit 0.24 0.0159 0.42 2.79 
Protected vegetables 0.24 0.0159 0.46 1.90 
Vegetables in the open  
(Arable farming) 
0.24 0.0159 0.20 0.20 
Vegetables in the open 
(Horticulture) 
0.24 0.0159 0.45 1.95 
 
 
Substitution between the sub-sectors is low (Table A1.2). The substitution elasticity 
is 0.24% implying that if fruit prices rise with 0.24% relative to the price index for fruits 
and vegetables, fruit acreage rises with 0.24%. Note that the performance of the estimation 
in terms of the error term is not optimal. The Durbin-Watson coefficient is particularly low 
for greenhouse vegetables. We tried to incorporate other arable products into our estima-
tions, but so far the results have been disappointing.  
Table A1.3 and A1.4 give the results for Italy. In general, the results for Italy are less 
convincing than they are for the Netherlands. Autocorrelation is a more serious problem 
for Italy. The substitution elasticities found for Italy are lower than the ones found for the 
Netherlands. For the intragroup elasticity for fruit, this result is reasonable, since the fruit 
composite group is far more heterogeneous in Italy than it is in the Netherlands. For arable 
crops, this argument is less convincing, as far as we know.  
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Table A1.3 Estimation results for Italy: intragroup elasticities 
  Coefficient: 
Substitution 
Elasticity 
Standard Error Rho DW coefficient 
Apple 0.37 0.0030 0.30 2.03 
Citrus 0.37 0.0030 0.30 1.94 
Cherries 0.37 0.0030 0.30 1.77 
Grapes 0.37 0.0030 0.30 2.13 
Fruit 
Pears 0.37 0.0030 0.30 1.79 
Beans 0.12 0.0116 0.25 0.48 
Carrots 0.12 0.0116 0.26 1.46 
Onions 0.12 0.0116 0.07 0.42 
Crops in the open I - 
Arable farming 
Potatoes 0.12 0.0116 0.33 1.63 
Asparagus 0.08 0.0118 0.38 0.61 
Cauliflower  0.08 0.0118 0.38 1.89 
Cucumbers 0.08 0.0118 0.38 1.93 
Lettuce  0.08 0.0118 0.38 1.34 
Crops in the open II 
- Horticulture 
Strawberry 0.08 0.0118 0.38 0.38 
Table A1.4 Estimation results for Italy: intergroup elasticities 
 Coefficient: 
Substitution 
Elasticity 
Standard Error Rho DW coefficient 
Fruit 0.12 0.01133 .29 .67 
Vegetables from arable farming 0.12 0.01133 .42 1.39 
Vegetables from horticulture 0.12 0.01133 .40 .36 
 
 
A more general system of land equations  
 
Demand for land for the respective crops is also estimated using the following log-linear 
system of (ad hoc) demand equations:  
εlnpγβlnHAαhaln
J
1j
j jj
+++= ∑
=
 
This system has been estimated using SURE and correcting for autocorrelation. In theory, 
one may also estimate systems of net output equations and submit them to theoretical ex-
pectations with respect to the parameters (homogeneity, symmetry and sign of the Hes-
sian). The corresponding data requirements are higher. The estimation process is more 
elaborate.  
Table A1.5 gives the (cross) price elasticities of land for a more general system of de-
rived demand equations for land. Table A1.5 refers to both vegetables and arable products, 
the closest supply substitutes of (processing) tomatoes. The own price elasticity of land al-
location equals 0.03-0.24%. The cross price elasticities suggest that cereals and (process-
ing) tomatoes are complements and that (processing) tomatoes and other industrial crops 
(fodder beans, oil seeds, sugar beets and tobacco) are substitutes of (processing) tomatoes. 
Note that tomatoes and vegetables from intensive horticultural production are substitutes as 
well.  
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Table A1.5 Own and cross price elasticities for the demand for land in Italy  
 
Constant Area Cereals Toma-
toes 
Arable 
vegeta-
bles 
Other 
vegeta-
bles 
Other 
crops 
R2 DW 
Cereals 0,26 0,97 0,04 0,03 0,01 -0,08 -0,01 95 1,93 
Tomatoes -0,17 0,71 0,07 0,25 0,07 -0,17 0,02 28 1,51 
Arable 
vegetables 
-0,34 0,81 0,38 -0,09 0,16 -0,36 -0,03 93 1,99 
Other 
vegetables 
13,57 -0,10 -0,08 -0,10 -0,04 0,03 0,03 87 1,83 
Other crops -4,15 1,10 -0,27 -0,28 -0,12 0,69 0,06 27 1,79 
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Appendix 2. Changes in hectare use (percentage changes)  
 Austria BelLux Cyprus Czech 
Rep 
Den-
mark 
Estonia Finland France Ger-
many 
Greece Hun-
gary 
Ireland Italy Latvia 
Apples -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.6 0.4 0.0 3.6 -0.1 
Bananas          0.9     
Citrus   -0.1     0.1  0.8   2.2  
Cucumbers 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.0 2.0 0.1 
Grapes 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0    0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1  0.9  
Onions 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 2.0 0.1 
Other fruits 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.3  -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 2.7 -0.1 
Other vegetables 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 1.8 0.1 
Pears -0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0   -0.1 -0.3 1.1 0.3 0.0 2.5 -0.1 
Peppers 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4    0.0  0.5 0.7  1.6  
Tomatoes fresh 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 1.8 0.1 
Tomatoes processed   -31.8     -18.5  -14.2 -23.8  -36.5  
 
Lithua-
nia 
Malta Mo-
rocco 
Nether-
lands 
Poland Portu-
gal 
ROW Slovak 
Rep 
Slove-
nia 
Spain Sweden Turkey UK  
Apples -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.6 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1  
Bananas     0.1     1.1 0.0     0.5   0.1    
Citrus   0.6 -0.1     0.6 -0.1     0.3   -0.1    
Cucumbers 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0  
Grapes   -0.2 0.1 0.1   0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.1   -0.3 -0.1  
Onions 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0  
Other fruits 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.6 0.0 0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.2  
Other vegetables 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0  
Pears -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.2  
Peppers   0.0 0.1 0.2   0.6 0.0 0.3   0.4   0.0 0.0  
Tomatoes fresh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.0 -0.1 0.1   0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0  
Tomatoes processed   -26.7 0.7   -24.3 -15.7 10.6     -14.7   4.0    
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Appendix 3. Changes in output (percentage changes)  
 Austria BelLux Cyprus Czech 
Rep 
Den-
mark 
Estonia Finland France Ger-
many 
Greece Hun-
gary 
Ireland Italy Latvia 
Apples -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 3.6 -0.1 
Bananas                   0.8         
Citrus     -0.1         0.1   0.8     2.2   
Cucumbers 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.0 2.0 0.1 
Grapes 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0       0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1   0.9   
Onions 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 2.0 0.1 
Other fruits 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.6 0.1 0.0 2.7 -0.1 
Other vegetables 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 1.7 0.1 
Pears -0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0     -0.1 -0.3 1.1 0.3   2.4 -0.1 
Peppers 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4       0.0   0.5 0.7   1.6   
Tomatoes fresh 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 1.8 0.1 
Tomatoes processed     -31.8         -18.5   -14.2 -23.8   -36.5   
 
Lithua-
nia 
Malta Mo-
rocco 
Nether-
lands 
Poland Portugal ROW Slovak 
Rep 
Slove-
nia 
Spain Sweden Turkey UK 
 
Apples -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.6 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1  
Bananas     0.1     1.1 0.0     0.5   0.1    
Citrus   0.5 -0.1     0.6 -0.1     0.3   -0.1    
Cucumbers 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0  
Grapes   -0.3 0.1 0.1   0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0   -0.3 -0.1  
Onions 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0  
Other fruits -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.6 0.0 0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.2  
Other vegetables 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0  
Pears -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.2  
Peppers   0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.3   0.4   0.0   
Tomatoes fresh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.0 -0.1 0.1   0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0  
Tomatoes processed   -26.7 0.7   -24.3 -15.7 10.6     -14.7   4.0    
